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EXCLUSIVE ARRANGEMENTS AND REFUSAL TO
DEAL PROBLEMS*
REYNOLDS C. SEITZ**

Justification for including a discussion on exclusive dealing arrangements and on refusal to deal decisions in a symposium devoted to trade
practices rests upon the practical consideration that there exists on the
part of business management a considerable interest in the two commercial tools.
Business executives find appeal in the prospect of using a contract
calling for exclusive dealing.' Those engaged in commerce have for
a variety of purposes frequently employed as a lever the refusal to
deal.
Possible antitrust implications in the use of the two devices has not
always been understood by business. In recent years, however, the
volume of litigation2 and various efforts at education have more and
more induced a consciousness of possible antitrust liability and encouraged questions of lawyer advisors to business.
This analysis is intended to give guidance which will assist in
answering the questions which may be raised.
Since exclusive dealing arrangements and refusal to deal take different forms and are used for varied purposes, it is logical to define
under appropriate headings variations in pattern and to discuss the
application of the law of trade practice to each enumerated variation.
Part I will concern itself with the area of exclusive dealing and part
II with that of refusals to deal.
I-ExcLusIvE DEALING ARRANGEmENTS
Seller Sponsored Exclusive Supply
And Total Requirement Contracts
The least sophisticated and most elementary type of exclusive deal* This Article will concern itself solely with federal legislation affecting
exclusive dealing and refusal to deal efforts. Obvious justification for such
limitation rests upon the recognition that so much of business endeavor involves interstate commerce.
** Dean and Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Currently teaching Trade Regulations and Labor Law. Formerly taught Creighton
and Northwestern Universities; assistant to the superintendent of public
schools in Omaha and St. Louis; senior attorney, National Labor Relations
Board, Washington, D.C.; labor relation attorney, Montgomery Ward and
Company, Chicago; executive, Chicago Daily News; director, Chicago Division,
Medill School of Journalism, Northwestern University.
1. See Lockhart and Sacks, The Relevance of Economic Factors in Determining Whether Exclusive Arrangements Violate Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, 65 HAuiv. L. Rxv. 913 (1952), for an exhaustive discussion of the many
good economic uses for exclusive dealing contracts.
2. The number of cases reported in CCH Trade Cases since 1932 is most
impressive.
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ing arrangement is one forced upon a purchaser by a seller even though
the purchaser in no way solicits or encourages the arrangement. Sometimes the offer is couched in terms which require the purchaser to buy
full requirements from the seller. If the pressure of the seller could
always be explained on the ground of desire to restrain trade or
intent to monopolize, there would be little quarrel with a rigid application of the Sherman Act 3 for the purpose of curbing the seller.
As a practical matter, however, such intent frequently does not motivate sellers. The purpose may be to insure maximum sales effort on
the part of dealers. The full requirement approach may be made to
reduce sales cost. Some sellers, highly conscious of the value of good
will, may feel that exclusion of competing lines is necessary in order
to make certain of the development of a specialized service department.4
The mere fact that the seller may have a reason apart from restraint of trade and intent to monopolize obviously does not mean
that all exclusive dealing patterns can be upheld which do not run
afoul of the Sherman Act. This is because efforts on the part of the
seller may injure others. Competing suppliers may be harmed by the
closing of markets. Newcomers, may find it most difficult to break
into the field if enough outlets are tied up. The consumer may suffer
if sufficient competition is affected.
The federal trade regulation laws recognized this in section 3 of the
Clayton Act 5 which in relevant part forbids any person
to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States
or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such
price, on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or
purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or competitors
of the lessor or seller, where the effect of the lease, sale, or contract for
sale on such. condition, agreement, or understanding may be to . substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of
commerce.
Section 3 has become the major tool used in assessing the validity of
exclusive arrangements. It is particularly recognized that the test
appliedunder the Clayton Act is less stringent than the Sherman Act
test of "unreasonable restraint of trade4' because the Clayton Act
was designed to condemn practices before fruition. 6
3 26"STAT. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1-7 (1952).

4. All of the enumerated reasons are mentioned by Lockhart and Sacks,
supra note 1, at 921-22.
5. 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1952).

6. See Rashid, Antitrust Aspects of, Exclusive Dealing Arrangements, 40

GEO. L.J. 241, 267 (1952).
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In commenting upon the fact that section 3 must be recognized as the

dominant statute bearing upon exclusives, Handler7 argues that if
an agreement is valid under section 3, it should never be condemned
under the Sherman Act or the Federal Trade Commission Act 8 unless
some additional pressure has been exerted.

The "effect" clause of section 3, which speaks of substantially lessening competition or tending to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, has drawn the most scrutiny. The meaning of the words may
appear xather self-evident to the casual reader or to those uninitiated
in trade regulation law. It may seem that those accused of violation
of section 3 could always prove that there had not been a lessening
of competition. The words may suggest that a defendant would always be permitted to show such facts as an increase in the number
of competitors, an increase in the volume of competitors, and a de-

crease in plaintiff's share of the market.
There has, however, been no such universal interpretation of the

"effect" clause. In Standard Fashion Co. v. Magrane-Houston Co.9
the United States Supreme Court gave early indication that it would
not require a complete market analysis to support a finding of violation
under section 3. The fact that the manufacturer-seller or the holding
company controlling it had by means of exclusive dealing arrangemen.Ats ctrol
on.a national basis of about forty per cent of the
existiig-52,000 retail outlets for dress patterns caused the court to
infer' that competition has been or probably would be lessened. 10 The
"dominant" position of the seller was enough of a test to satisfy the
court."
As .rcpitly as 1954 the "dominance" test was unequivocally approve'd by a strong court. Judge Harold Medina,. wariting for the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Dictograph
Products v. FTC 2 was willing to ignore evidence .qiiding to indicate
that 'finibers of competitors in a particular liine,'of commerce had
increased in spite of Dictograph's exclusive d6aling requirements.
This willingness was grounded upon the fact thapro6f at. a y. early
stage had shown that Dictograph (a manufacturer- of .earing .a.id
products)' dominated and was a leader in the ind~istry..
Judge Medina saw the birth of section 3 of the-Clayton .Act as are-:
action to a 1903 Circuit Court of Appeals 1iolding's that the Sherna
Act did not apply to the refusal by a leading producer of -chewing
tobacco to. sell to a dealer who would not agree to deal exclusively.in
7. -IandIr,Recent Antitfrust Developments, 9 REcORD i71 (1954).
8. 38 STAT. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1952).
9. 258 U.S. 346 (1922).
10. Id. at 357.
11. Note, 33 N.C.L. REv. 706 (1955).
12. 217 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940 (1955).
13. Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co., 125 Fed. 454. (8th Cir. 1903).
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the seller's products. Medina stated directly that the inclusion of the
qualifying phrase of section 3 "in no way supports the view that it
was designed to effect a renaissance of the Sherman Act type of
inquiry into all economic factors."1 4 And a few paragraphs later, he
continued: "[I]t is hard to believe that the Congress envisioned a full
dress inquiry into economic motives or effects of such contracts in all
cases, including those involving the use of these devices by estabu5
lished leaders or prominent businesses in an industry.'
While admitting that the history of the "except" clause shows an
intent on the part of Congress to give a limited legal sanction to certain exclusive dealing activities of newcomers or small business enterprises so as to permit them to more effectively compete with established concerns, Judge Medina found no difficulty in submitting that
Congress did not intend to sanction the exclusive dealing endeavors
of a concern in the economic position of Dictograph. He did this by
pointing out that
it seems clear that whatever utility the elaborate economic inquiry contended for by the petitioner may still have under section 3 of the Clayton
Act when applied to organizations not doing a substantial share of the
business or not yet firmly established in a particular line of commerce,
it has no place in a case such as this where the condemned contracts are
being employed by a corporation which does almost $2,000,000 worth
of business each year, is one of the industry's three leaders... and which
alone controls by such means over one fifth of the nation's prime retail
outlets for [hearing aid] products .... 16
Complete market analysis as a test for violation of section 3 was
passed over by the United States Supreme Court in the very significant 1949 decision of Standard Oil Co. v. United States.7 The
Court made clear also that it would not insist on a finding that the
seller enjoyed dominant leadership. The fact that impressed the five
man majority was that Standard Oil sold $58,000,000 worth of gasoline
under the full requirement contracts it made with about five thousand
independent dealers in a seven state western area. It saw in this fact
that competition had been foreclosed in a substantial share of the
gasoline market and created the probability of economic harm. It
made no difference that the exclusive supply contracts covered only
16% of the retail gasoline outlets and 6.7% of the total gasoline sales
in the western area. The Court declined to appraise the economic
consequences. The majority explicitly refused to consider whether
the requirement contracts might have been economically beneficial or
14.
15.
16.
17.

217 F.2d at 827.
Ibid.
Ibid.
337 U.S. 293 (1948).
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might have intensified rather than reduced competition in the market
as dissenting Justices Jackson, Vinson and Burton contended it should
have done. Section 3 was held not to require the same proof of market
consequences as the Sherman Act. Contracts covering any substantial
share of commerce appeared to be labeled per se illegal because by
their very nature they exclude competition from that segment of the
trade which they cover.
In 1952 in Richfield Oil Corp. v. United States18 the United States
Supreme Court felt impelled to follow the recently decided Standard
Oil case. Involved factually were exclusive contracts made by another
of the big seven oil companies on the west coast with thousands of
service stations which have sales of over forty million dollars annually.
The Supreme Court's "quantitative substantiality" test has evoked a
great deal of criticism. Lockhart and Sacks spoke out forcefully in the
HarvardLaw Review as early as 1952.19 While acknowledging that the
quantity test facilitates the task of enforcing section 3 and removes a
great deal of uncertainty as to the legality of proposed or existing
exclusive agreements, the authors doubt the propriety of this consideration where Congress has made reasonably plain that it wanted
an analysis in each case of the effect of the particular arrangements
upon competition.
Writing in the February 1955 American Bar Association Journal,2°
Thomas E. Sunderland, General Counsel of Standard Oil of Indiana,
makes a broad attack on per se illegality in exclusive dealing cases. His
argument is particularly forceful as an answer to condemnation of
exclusive arrangements on the mere ground of coverage of a substantial volume of commerce. Noting that there is most frequently
other thousands of dealer and jobber outlets, Sunderland contends
that other sellers are not denied access to a market even though some
exclusive dealing arrangements may produce large volume return.
Most frequently, he says, the public is not harmed where a dealer
chooses to distribute through a reseller who agrees to concentrate on
the seller's line of products.
Of major significance is the attitude of the Attorney General's
National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. In its Report of
March 1955 the Committee states: "[T]he mere coverage of a substantial volume of commerce by exclusive dealing arrangements,
while a factor to be considered, is not tantamount to a foreclosure of
rivals from access to a substantial market, so that some analysis of
18. 343 U.S. 922 (1952).

19. Lockhart and Sacks, supra note 1.
20. Sunderland, Antitrust Developments: A New Era for Competitive Pricing, 41 A.B.A.J. 113, 115 (1955).
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particular distributive patterns is essential to any determination of
21
actual foreclosure."
It is significant that the Report of the Attorney General's Committee concentrates its attack on the philosophy of Standard Oil on the
ground that it creates a per se rule of liability. As Handler points
out, the Committee does not condemn the actual result in Standard
Oil because factually "the use of exclusive dealing contracts by Standard Oil's competitors withdrew most of the suitable retail outlets
from the smaller marketing companies" and "as a result, competition
may possibly have been foreclosed not only quantitatively, but also
qualitatively." 22
The attacks on Standard Oil and on the efforts to create per se
liability under section 3 of the Clayton Act have to date forced no
reversal on the part of the courts.
Of course, after Standard Oil Justice Frankfurter, who wrote the
opinion in Standard Oil, did explain in his dissent in FTC v. Motion
Picture Advertising Serv., Inc.2 3 that more than mere quantitative
substantiality was in fact involved in Standard. In 1953 the FTC
broke with the philosophy of Standard Oil in its Maico Hearing Aid
Co.2 4 decision by stating that it was wrong of its hearing examiner
to reject all of the attempts of Maico Hearing Aid Company to present
evidence for the purpose of showing: (1) that there had been an increase in the number of competitors, (2) that the volume of business
of its competitors had increased, (3) that its share of the market had
been decreasing, (4) that its dealers constitute a small percent of
the total number of hearing aid dealers in the country, and (5) other
matters relating to effect on competition.
Although the Maico Hearing Aid Company was of substantial size
and its volume was growing, it was not dominant in the industry and,
therefore, did not stand at all in the way of the court which tussled
with the DictographProductscase.
Authorities take a most pessimistic attitude as to the future influence which the FTC market analysis approach of Maico may have
on court decisions. Handler feels that the FTC itself is giving only
lip service to Maico. "It is not clear," he states, "that the application
of the doctrine provides any different results from the Standard Sta-

21. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAws 147 (1955). The Committee says, "Our conception of substantiality is whether competitors in fact have ready access to adequate
sources of supply and to a sufficient number of outlets to enable their products to be effectively marketed." Id. at 147 n. 73.

22. Handler, Annual Review of Antitrust Developments, 10 REcoRD 332, 340-

41 (1955).
23. 344 U.S. 392, 398 (1953).
24. CCH TRADE REQ. REP. ff 25329 (1955).
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tions25 rule of quantitative substantiality. 26 Citing Revlon Products
Corp.27 he contends that the Commission has forbidden arrangements
in circumstances at least suggesting that competitors had fairly effective and ready access to markets. Beltone Hearing Aid Co. 28 is men-

tioned to establish that some of the commission examiners not only
apply the quantitative substantiality test but refer uncritically to
Standard Oil.
Sunderland cautions that the decision of the FTC in Outboard
Marine and Mfg. Co.2 9 "revives the confusion as to whether and to
what extent economic evidence is pertinent to the proof of injury to
competition."' 0
Buyer Requested Full Requirement Contract
Often instead of a seller exerting pressure to force a full requirement or exclusive dealing contract, the purchaser requests that the
seller agree to fulfill requirements. In return the purchaser will
frequently agree to handle only the products of the seller.
Good reasons can motivate the buyer's attitude. The Attorney General's Committee on Antitrust in its Report acknowledges that requirement contracts may be preferred by customers "as assuring a
steady, adequate source of supply, affording protection against price
fluxuation and facilitating long term business plans."'1 In the United
States v. American Can Co.3 2 decision the court indicated awareness
that some exclusive arrangements might serve mutual interests of the
contracting parties without unreasonably foreclosing others from the
market. The court was able to see that in the canning industry full
requirement contracts assure the canner the necessary quantities whatever the size of the unpredictable pack. 33
The realization that the buyer may desire the benefit of a full requirement contract suggests a question. Does such desire have any
impact upon the interpretation of section 3 of the Clayton Act?
Judge Nordbye helps give an answer in the J. I. Case3 4 controversy.
Although showing a recognition that exclusive handling arrangements may result from a mutual recognition that sound business practice demands them 5 the tenor of much of his discussion indicates that
a voluntary request on the part of a purchaser-dealer will not clothe
25. The name used to identify the case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
337 U.S. 293 (1948).
26. Handler, supranote 22, at 341.
27. CCH TRADE REG. REP. ii[r 25184, 25249 (1954).
28. CCH TRADE REG. REP. II 25397 (1955).
29. CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 26087 (1956).

30. Recent Developments in Antitrust Laws, 38 CHm. B.R. 151 (1957).

31.

32.
33.
34.
35.

REPORT,

Op. cit. supra note 21, at 146.

87 F. Supp. 18 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
Id. at 31, 32.
United States v. J. I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856 (D. Minn. 1951).
Id. at 862.
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exclusive arrangements with legality if there is a showing that the
likely effect will substantially weaken competition in the final

market. 36 In FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv., Inc. 37 the

United States Supreme Court supported the Commission and refused to clothe with legality exclusive exhibition agreements on the
ground that there was no coercion involved and that the theater owners actually requested them.
There is, however, in both Motion Picture Advertising Service and
American Can a philosophy which can be applied with particular appropriateness in a situation where it is found that the buyer desires
the exclusive dealing arrangement. The courts in both cases indicated
that the length of the exclusive contract may have something to do
with its reasonableness as respects competition. In each case five year
contracts were condemned but one year contracts were upheld.
In spelling out its position the court in American Can said: "To
strike down the requirements contracts and to declare them totally
void . . . without at the same time affording the user-consumer a

supply over a limited period of time, would be destructive, illogical,
unsound and not in consonance with the acute and particular problems
confronting the canning industry."38 The court in American Can was
not deterred by the fact that the defendant did 46% of the total competitive sales with almost all of its volume under requirement contracts. In Motion PictureAdvertising Service defendant had exclusive
contracts with 40% of the theaters in the area in which it operated.
The Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Antitrust
strongly supports the thinking of the courts in the cases just cited.
Flexible short-term contracts, says the committee, "may leave greater
opportunities to rivals than an absolute sale of a larger quantity which
would fill the buyer's needs for a longer time. ' 39
It must be noted that neither American Can nor Motion Picture
Advertising Service were grounded on section 3 of the Clayton Act.
Therefore, in relation to such section they are of importance only because of the philosophy they enunciate. Actually American Can applied the Sherman Act and held that section 3 of the Clayton Act
did not pertain to full requirement contracts because of the inapplicability of the specific language before the "effect" clause which
has to do with sale on condition that the purchaser will not deal in the
goods of a competitor. Motion Pictur Advertising Service was prosecuted under the "unfair methods of competition" proviso of section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.4 0
36. Id. at 865, 866.
37. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).

38. 87 F. Supp. at 31.

39. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 21, at 146.

40. 52 STAT. 111 (1938), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952).
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The writer cannot agree that section 3 has no application to full
requirement contracts. Most persuasive on the point is a case note in
the 1950 Minnesota Law Review 41 which criticizes the technical approach of American Can. Certainly a sale on condition may be implied so that section 3 can be employed.
Exclusive Distributorships
An exclusive distributorship program takes the form of placing a
restraint upon the seller. The seller agrees not to deal with any other
buyer, typically within a prescribed territory. The arrangement may
also require the buyer to agree to sell only within an assigned territory. The validity of the two types of arrangement must be discussed
separately.
In the case where the seller merely agrees not to deal with any
other buyer within a prescribed territory, section 3 of the Clayton
Act does not apply because there is no restriction placed upon the
buyer.42 The Sherman Act may, however, have an impact upon the
situation. Consideration must be given to the question as to whether
there is restraint of trade or a scheme to monopolize. In thinking
through the problem it must be remembered in accordance with the
rule at common law43 that exclusive selling agreements have been regarded under the Sherman Act as an ancillary restraint having a
legitimate business purpose.44 This is because it has been recognized
that many such agreements will afford fair protection to the buyer
without injuring the public. This will be true where effective competition exists at both seller and buyer levels. The Report of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws expresses
the feeling that if the seller agrees not to deal with any other buyer
within a reasonably defined area, the arrangement should be sustained
as lawful if it is created to serve a valid business purpose and if there
45
is no attempt to monopolize the field.
This philosophy is forcefully and logically enunciated by the district
court 46 and approved by the Fourth Circuit 47 in Schwing Motor Co. v.
Hudson Sales Corp. Although aware of the fact that an exclusive
41. See 34 MnAD:.L. REV. 570 (1950). The author cites a number of cases
in support of his thesis.

42. Marine Equipment & Supply Co. v. Trojan Boat Co., CCH TRADE REG.

REP. (1957 Trade Cas.) ff 68708 at 72862 (Pa. C.P. of Lancaster County).
43. RESTATE1ENT, CONTRACTS § 516 (1932); Black and White Taxicab and
Transfer Co. v. Brown and Yellow Taxicab and Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518
(1928).
44. Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331, 335 (2d Cir.
1953); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 45 F. Supp. 387, 398-99

(S.D.N.Y. 1942), af'd, 321 U.S. 707, 719 (1944).
45. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 21, at 27-28.
46. 138 F. Supp. 899 (D. Md. 1956).
47. 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956).
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dealership involved a limited monopoly to sell the product of a manu.
facturer in the area covered by the exclusive agreement, the courts felt
that the arrangement was not per se an illegal extension of the right
of a manufacturer to exercise his independent judgment as to the selection of parties with whom he will deal.4 8 Spelled out by District
Judge Thomsen was the test of whether the arrangement prejudiced
the public interest by unduly restricting the free flow of interstate
commerce. Turning to the facts Thomsen found no evidence that the
public was unable to purchase at competitive prices all the automobiles
it desired. He observed that the evidence did not even indicate that
the public could not buy at competitive prices all the Hudson cars it
wanted.
The court made clear that its attitude would be different if the facts
had shown a horizontal conspiracy among competitors or if Hudson
49
enjoyed a dominant position in the industry or in the local market.
The philosophy of the Hudson case has been bolstered by the very
recent holding of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co.50 where in tussling
with an exclusive distributorship given by Packard Motor Company to
one dealer in the city of Baltimore, the court overruled Judge Holtzoff
51
who had passed upon the matter at the district level.
In coming to its conclusion the appeals court was not impressed
with the argument of the district court or with that of dissenting
Judge Bazelon that it made a difference if pressure for an exclusive
distributorship came from the dealer rather than from the seller. Obviously the court, like Judge Thomsen in the Hudson case, must have
felt that it could not ignore the practicalities of the situation which included a recognition that "such decisions are not made in a vacuum;,
and that it could not be supposed that a manufacturer would "decide
to reduce the number of its dealers in a particular city from 5 to 3 or
from 2 to 1 without discussing the matter with dealers whom it wished
to retain. ' 52 In this connection it is pertinent to reflect upon the fact
that since the exclusive selling covenant is to protect the dealer from
competition in the manufacturer's product and there is no necessity
for the manufacturer to impose a contractual restraint upon himself,
it is logical to expect that impetus for the agreement will typically
53
come from the dealer.
The appeals court was not troubled by the fact that as a result of
48. 138 F. Supp.at 902-03.
49. Id. at 904-05.

50. 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957).

51. Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 135 F. Supp. 4 (D.D.C.

1955).

52. For Judge Thomsen's views see 138 F. Supp. at 906.
53. This is the thought expressed by Handler, Annual Antitrust Review, 11

RECORD 367, 372 (1956).
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the arrangement only one Packard dealer remained in Baltimore.
Relying upon the Cellophane54 case the court found "no monopoly or
attempt or conspiracy to monopolize within the meaning of the Sherman Act"'55 because there are other cars reasonably interchangeable by
consumers and, therefore, in competition with Packards.
The court found no unreasonable restraint. Rather it saw a good
business reason for the arrangement and concluded by saying: "The
short of it is that a relatively small manufacturer, competing with
large manufacturers, thought it advantageous to retain its largest
dealer in Baltimore and could not do so without agreeing to drop its
other Baltimore dealers. To penalize the small manufacturer for competing in this way not only fails to promote the policy of the antitrust
laws but defeats it."56
Now it seems necessary to turn attention to the exclusive distributorship arrangement where the seller agrees not to deal with any other
buyer within a prescribed territory but in return requires the buyer
to agree to sell only within an assigned geographical area. In determining the validity of this quite usual provision in a grant of exclusive distributorship the basic consideration should be whether the
dealers appointed as exclusive distributors face effective competition
from other sales outlets. In a number of cases involving a dealer
restrictive territorial clause the courts have been satisfied that the
seller does not occupy a monopolistic position and that there was
effective outside competition.5 7
The government recently, however, started action against J. P.
Seeburg Corporation, alleging that the company produced more than
forty per cent of the total national output of coin operated phonographs
and was the largest manufacturer in the United States of such equipment. Undoubtedly, aware of its vulnerable position on the ground of
lack of effective competition, Seeburg consented to a decree prohibiting it from limiting or restricting the persons to whom or the
territory within which any distributor may choose to sell phonographs.58
Tying Arrangements
Another form of exclusive arrangement which requires some analysis is the tying agreement. Most frequently the arrangement obligates
a lessee or purchaser of a device (very often a patented device) to
54.
55.
56.
57.
cert.

United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
243 F.2d at 418.
Id. at 421.
Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822 (2d Cir. 1942),
denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943); Tillar v. Cole Motor Car Co., 246 Fed. 831
(5th Cir. 1917), cert. denied, 247 U.S. 511 (1918); Phillips v. Iola Portland
Cement Co., 125 Fed. 593 (8th Cir. 1903), cert. denied, 192 U.S. 606 (1904).
58. United States v. J. P. Seeburg Corp., CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1957 Trade
Cas.) ff 68613 (N.D. IlL Jan. 31, 1957).
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use with it only the supplies sold by the lessor or seller. Less commonly a sale is made and the buyer is required to make a simultaneous
purchase of a complimentary product.
A rather logical argument can be presented to support labeling
tying arrangements per se illegal under section 3 of the Clayton Act.
Lockhart and Sacks59 reason "that it should not be necessary to determine the precise degree of market control over the controlled product" to conclude that the tying device has an effect on competition.
They pointed out that unless there are quite exceptional facts the
very existence of the tying arrangement would seem to indicate that
the supplier has sufficient market control to force his customers to
adhere to the tying arrangement and thus to lessen competition in the
tied product. Their argument continued through the submission of
the idea that the competition which section 3 of the Clayton Act intends to safeguard will not be preserved by practices which promote
sales not on the basis of the merit of a product but on the strength
of the market control which a seller is able to secure over some other
product.
Both the Standard Oil6° and Times-Picayune6' cases emphasize that
tying arrangements "serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression
of competition." The Attorney General's Committee on Antitrust
Laws agrees with the court's observation in Times-Picayune that "in
the usual case only the prospect of reducing competition would persuade a seller to adopt such a contract and only his control of the
supply of the typing device, whether conferred by patent, monopoly
62
or otherwise obtained, could induce a buyer to enter one."
A warning against finding tying agreements per se illegal was
sounded in 1954 by the FTC in the Insto-Gas Corporation63 litigation.
The Commission remanded to a hearing examiner a case in which
Insto-Gas Corporation of Detroit was charged with unlawful use of
tying contracts (under section 3) in connection with the leasing of
propane gas cylinders and propane gas and appliances. The Commission said that in spite of Justice Frankfurter's statement in Standard
Oil, that tying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition, it knew of no case in which tying contracts without more have been declared illegal per se. The Commission commented that in the Standard Oil case the court rejected the
necessity of demonstrating economic consequences once it had been
established that the volume of business affected is not insignificant
or insubstantial.
59. Lockhart and Sacks, supranote 1, at 944.
60. 337 U.S. at 305.
61. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
62. REPORT, OP. cit supra note 21, at 145
63. CCH TRADE REG. REP.ff 25188 (1954).
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One of the justifications defendants often present in answer to a
charge that a tying arrangement is illegal is the necessity of protecting
good will. In the General Motors, Sinclair,5and J. I. Case Co., cases
the protection of good will defense was given some recognition, but
for the most part the courts have been hard to convince that good will
was really in danger in cases where tying agreements were an issue.
International Business Machines Corp. v. United States, 67 is an example. The Attorney General's Committee on Antitrust Laws has a
logical reason to explain why the good will defense will not ordinarily
succeed.6 It says: "[O]rdinarily the manufacturer's good will is adequately safeguarded by reasonable specifications of the supplies the
main product requires."
It is necessary to scrutinize carefully the actual steps that have
been taken before concluding that the parties have entered into an
illegal tying arrangement. The recent case of Technical Tape Corp.
v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. 69 alerts us to such fact. In that litigation it was alleged that a patent holder abused its monopoly on transparent adhesive tape by selling it on. condition that the purchaser
thereof buy other tape made by the patent holder but not covered by
the patent and by selling its patented transparent tape on condition
that the purchaser thereof refrain from buying other adhesive tape
products from any other manufacturer.
In reacting to the allegation the second circuit found no violation of
section 3 of the Clayton Act but merely a legitimate refusal to deal for
good business reasons.70 Persuasive was the evidence that certain
distributors and jobbers were guilty of one or more of the following
practices: Disparaging a defendant's product in order to substitute
other cheaper brands of tape, failure to fairly display or sell defdndant's tape, pushing competitors' products to the detriment of the
defendant's product and making no effort to sell defendant's product.71
The court concluded by stressing that "this is not a case where the
manufacturer imposed a uniform exclusive dealing contract on its
jobbers and distributors such as was the situation in Dictograph.... "7
The impact on tying arrangements of the Sherman Act is discussed
73
in Times-Picayune,
a case which involved efforts of a New Orleans
64. Pick Mfg. Co. v. General Motors Corp., 80 F.2d 641 (1935), aff'd per
U.S. 3 (1936).
65. FTC v. Sinclair Refining Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).

curiam, 299

66. See note 34 supra.
67. 298 U.S. 131 (1936).

See also United States v. American Linen Supply

Co., 141 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

REPORT, op. cit. supra note 21, at 142.
247 F.2d 343 (2d Cir. 1957).
Id. at 350.
Id. at 355.
Id. at 358.

73. Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
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publisher to force each advertiser to use both a morning and evening
newspaper which he owned. The court contrasted the application of
the Clayton Act and the Sherman Act in a tying arrangement situation. It said that "when the seller enjoys a monopolistic position in
the market for the 'tying' product, or if a substantial volume of commerce in the 'tied' products is restrained, a tying arrangement violates the narrow standards expressed in § 3 of the Clayton Act because
from either factor the required potential lessening of competition is
inferred. '' 74 On the other hand the court pointed out that there would
be no violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act unless there is found
a monopolist who forecloses competition from any substantial market.75 This conclusion follows, the court argued, because the restraint
76
could not be justified under any rule of reason.
II-REFUSALS TO DEAL

Refusals to deal include both refusals to sell and refusals to buy.
Because refusals to deal might be used as a lever to encourage exclusive dealing, it is logical that the discussion on the antitrust aspects
of the problem should follow part I of this article.
Even a most general awareness of the protection given in the United
States to freedom of choice of the businessman will suggest that any
discussion on the antitrust aspects of refusals to deal must be concerned
with balancing the right of freedom of choice against any specific
intent that is expressed in the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
That the United States Supreme Court would require such balancing
was early indicated in United States v. Colgate & Co. 77 in the comment
The purpose of the Sherman Act is ...to preserve the right of freedom
to trade. In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly,
the act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his
own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And,
of course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which
he will refuse to sell.7 8
74. Id. at 608-09.
75. Id. at 609.
76. In the Times-Picayune case a Sherman Act violation was alleged. There
was no claim of violation of § 3 of the Clayton Act because the FTC had given
an opinion to the effect that advertising space was not a "commodity" within
the meaning of the Clayton Act. (See 345 U.S. at 609 n. 27.) A five man majority treating both the morning and evening newspapers in New Orleans as
comprising one market and noting that the tie-in did not adversely effect
defendant's sole competitor found no violation of the Sherman Act over the
forceful dissent of four who complained that the majority overlooked that
the defendant enjoyed a distinct monopoly of access to morning readers and
used that monopoly to restrain unreasonably the competition for advertising
between its evening paper and another evening paper in New Orleans.
77. 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
78. Id. at 307.
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The broad sweep of the language in the Colgate case, where under
the facts the manufacturer's terms in respect to price maintenance
have been announced in advance, has caused many to feel that there
is an unqualified privilege of refusal to deal. That this is not actually
a legitimate inference is logically demonstrated in an article by McLaughlin in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review.7 9 In a
thorough analysis the author shows that the United States Supreme
Court procedure required the court to follow the district court's
conclusion that the indictment did not charge an agreement and
hence, merely boiled down to alleging that Colgate was refusing to
sell its goods to price cutters. Such background finding forced the
Court to uphold freedom of choice. Justice McReynolds, who wrote
the opinion in the Colgate case, made clear in Schrader's Son, Inc.80
that he was not enunciating an unqualified privilege to refuse to deal.
He stated that there is an "obvious difference between the situation
presented when a manufacturer merely indicates his wishes concerning prices and declines further dealing with all who fail to observe
them, and one where he enters into agreements-whether express or
implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances ... which
undertakes to bind to observe fixed resale prices." 81
Construing the application of section 5 of the FTC Act in the Beechnut02 controversy the Supreme Court did infer an agreement and condemned the refusal to deal stand of the defendant company.
The three cases just cited all involved efforts to enforce price maintenance. However, the philosophy enunciated by the courts on the
matter of the refusal to deal has significant application to the validity
of refusals as a technique to enforce exclusive dealing plans. One
important difference exists between the two factual situations. At
common law resale price maintenance agreements were per se illegal.
Hence, if the court found such an agreement, refusal to deal would
be condemned under the Sherman Act. When, however, refusal to
deal is a lever used to force exclusive arrangements or territorial restrictions in the form of contracts or agreements, it will become necessary, absent monopoly, to determine whether the restraint was unreasonable or substantially affected competition. Tests for ascertaining the reasonableness of restraint or effect upon competition were
analyzed in part I of this article.
The important matter which must now be approached is the determination of what constitutes evidence from which the court may
infer a contract or agreement. Certainly there are innumerable in79. McLaughlin, FairTrade Acts, 86 U. PA. L. REv. 803, 808-10 (1938).
80. United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920).
81. Id. at 99.
82. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952); FTC v. Beech-nut Packing
Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922).
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stances when no agreements have been inferred, and a refusal to deal
has been approved as an individual right.8 3
Any reflection on the right of freedom to select customers leads
inevitably to the conclusion that a manufacturer must be allowed to
protect himself against the results of ineffective selling. The manufacturer has to be concerned with sales volume. He must, therefore,
be given the right to refuse to deal further with the distributor who
fails to produce satisfactory results. The fact that the poor sales results may be influenced by the distributor's handling several products
should not affect the basic right of the manufacturer to act. Even a
warning which calls dilution of the selling effort to the attention of the
distributor and results in his election to handle only the products of
the protesting manufacturer should not be construed as anything other
than the exercise of a valid business right. The acquiescence of the
distributor should not create the agreement necessary to bring the
refusal within any condemnation of the antitrust laws.
Section 2 of the Clayton Act specifically preserves for sellers the
right to select their own customers. In part the section states: "Nothing herein contained shall prevent persons engaged in selling goods,
wares, or merchandise in commerce from selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade." 84
The business decision to refuse to deal, which is taken after study of
the results produced by an individual distributor, is a far different act
than a general announcement in advance of sale of a policy of refusing
to deal with a distributor who handles the products of competitors.
If a distributor heeds such general pronouncement, it does not seem
unreasonable to infer an agreement which may support a violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act.85 Certainly in the circumstances pictured the business right of the seller is outweighed by the intent of
the antitrust law. If such a scheme of distribution is not condemned,
the seller will be placed in a position where he can force exclusive
dealing by indirection.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act 86 can under certain circumstances be
used as a weapon against refusals to deal. A violation of the section
can be shown if a seller has a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co. 87 and
Lorain Journal Co. v. United States88 revealed clearly that purpose
could be deduced from connecting the refusal to sell to an illegal course
of conduct. In Eastman Kodak the defendant was embarked upon a
83. See, for exhaustive citation of cases, Barber, Refusals to Deal Under the
FederalAntitrust Laws, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 847, 857-58 (1955).
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

STAT. 730-31
26 STAT. 209
26 STAT. 209

(1914), 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
(1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1952).
(1890), 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1952).
273 U.S. 359 (1927).
342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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plan to gain control of competing supply houses. When plaintiff, a
supply house, refused to sell out to Eastman, the defendant refused
to continue to deal. In the Lorain Journal controversy a newspaper,
which reached ninety-nine per cent of Lorain, Ohio, families, refused
to deal with advertisers who spent money with the radio station in
a neighboring town. In both Eastman Kodak and Lorain Journal the
Court was merely affirming the philosophy earlier expressed in Colgate that the right to refuse to deal did not exist if there was any purpose to create or maintain monopoly. 89
When the majority of the United States Supreme Court interpreted
the evidence in Times-Picayuneas leading to the conclusion of motivation by "legitimate business aims" 90 it had no problem in finding that
the refusal to deal did not run afoul of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
The issue of the applicability of section 2 of the Sherman Act is
also found in a fact situation where the seller refuses to deal with the
buyer with whom he competes in the sale of a finished product. The
question is particularly significant when the facts reveal that the
buyer cannot get the product in sufficient quantity if he does not get
it from the seller who refuses to deal. Certainly if the seller achieved
his monopolistic position through predatory practices, a refusal to
sell to a competitor would almost surely be condemned by the courts.
The same condemnation cannot be predicted with assurance if the
seller rose to his position through efficiency or legitimate patent control. It would seem that except in unusual circumstances 91 the seller
should have full freedom of choice. Certainly the philosophy of the
du Pont92 case would not penalize the seller if there were substitutes
in the market which a buyer could purchase.
In discussing the impact of the Sherman Act upon refusals to deal
little time need be devoted to concerted refusals to deal. Whatever
difficulty exists in bringing individual refusals within the statutory
prohibitions of the Sherman Act disappears when the refusal stems
from group action. Then it becomes apparent that there is offensive
agreement and combination. Fashion Originators Guild v. FTC9 3
expresses the Supreme Court's opposition to refusals to deal in the
form of group boycotts. The Court was not impressed with the fact
that there was a rather plausible business purpose for the actions.
89. 250 U.S. at 307.
90. 345 U.S. at 622, 627.
91. Judicial distaste for a seller suspected of profiteering on Government
contracts in time of war appears to be the unusual circumstance which supported a finding of violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act in United States v.
Klearflax Linen Looms, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 3Z (D.Minn. 1945).
92. United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41, 229
(1953); see also note 54 supra.
93. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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Columbia Steel by dictum stated flatly that group boycotts were illegal
94

per se.

It is now necessary to turn attention to the possible impact of section 3 of the Clayton Act on refusal to deal problems. Scrutiny discloses that it appears to make quite a difference whether the government brings the action or whether it is brought by a disgruntled
buyer.
Citing cases the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws points out that private antitrust suits brought by
cut off buyers have not succeeded. 95 Barber asserts that in an action
between a cut off dealer and a seller section 3 is not involved because
it outlaws sales on condition and not refusals to sell. 96
That the government can more effectively use section 3 is indicated by Barber's comment that "in a suit brought by the government
a refusal to sell to a dealer who takes on or handles a competing line
may tend to establish that sales to other dealers are not being made
on condition or understanding that they shall not deal in competing
lines." 97 The Attorney General's Committee would also envision this
result by its statement that "termination of trade relations with some
one distributor who handles competing products may confirm the supplier's implicit insistence on exclusive dealing with others (and) may
reveal that continued sales to retained distributors are conditioned on
their exclusion of all rivals' goods and hence come within the prohibitions of section 3 of the Clayton Act." 98
The approach in Nelson Radio and Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc.99
of not finding a contract and hence no violation of section 3 when
the suit was brought by an aggrieved plaintiff is contrasted by a
comment writer in the New York University Law Review'00 with
that of finding a contract and section 3 offense in Carter Carburetor
Corp. v. FTC01 when action was instituted by the government. The
writer complains about the overly technical approach in Motorola
and argues that the spirit of the Clayton Act is better served by allowing its prophylactic character to operate to induce individuals not to
enter into illegal contracts rather than to withhold relief until such
a contract is consummated. 102
It would seem necessary to keep in mind that section 3 should never
be manipulated so as to nullify the legality of a refusal to deal
94. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1947) (dictum).
95. REPORT, op. cit. supra note 21, at 136.
96. Barber, supranote 83, at 860.
97. Ibid.
98. REPORT, op. cit. supranote 21, at 135.
99. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
100. 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1170 (1953).
101. 112 F.2d 722 (8th Cir. 1940).
102. 28 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1170 (1953).
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grounded upon a good business reason. In many of the actions brought
by private parties such defense is likely to be available. In most
cases it may be that the government will not begin action unless it feels
confident that the "good business reason" plea cannot be successfully
presented. If the government has been careful in its analysis, it should
enjoy success in the courts. Of course, even if section 3 of the Clayton
Act seems to cover the situation, it must be remembered that no violation can be found unless the effect "may be to substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."10 3
The first part of this article has presented tests to assist with such
determination.
CONCLUSION

It should by now be apparent that a decision on the legality of an
exclusive dealing arrangement or on a refusal to deal requires as a
first step a thorough factual determination of the type of exclusive
arrangement or refusal to deal and the reason for the business decision. As a second step it will be necessary to carefully apply the
antitrust philosophy enumerated by trade regulation authorities, the
Federal Trade Commission and the courts.
103. See note 4 supra.

